We propose an econometric procedure for obtaining de facto exchange rate regime classi…cations which we apply to study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth. Our classi…cation method models the de jure regimes as outcomes of a multinomial logit choice problem conditional on the volatility of a country's e¤ective exchange rate, a bilateral exchange rate and international reserves. An 'e¤ective' de facto exchange rate regime classi…cation is then obtained by assigning country-year observations to the regime with the highest predictive probability obtained from the estimation problem. An econometric investigation into the relationship between exchange rate regimes and GDP growth …nds that growth is higher under stable currency-value regimes. Signi…-cant asymmetric e¤ects on country growth from not doing what is said are found for nonindustrialized countries. Countries that exhibit 'fear of ‡oating'experience signi…cantly higher growth.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose using a familiar econometric procedure to obtain de facto classi…cations of national exchange rate policy. We then use this de facto classi…cation to investigate the role of exchange rate regimes in growth and whether di¤erences between what countries say and what they do matter for growth. Accurate and meaningful classi…cations of a country's currency management are crucial for assessing the merits between …xed and ‡oating exchange rates. Until recently, empirical research employed the de jure classi…cation, which largely re ‡ects the self-reported regime submitted by a country's central bank to the International Monetary Fund. However, observers have noted that for many countries, de facto management of currencies seems at odds with their de jure management. 1 As a result of such discrepancies, the de jure classi…cation has been viewed as unsatisfactory for assessing the role of exchange rate stability in economic performance and has motivated researchers to propose de facto exchange rate classi…cations that are based on observed properties of the foreign exchange market data.
In ‡uential contributions include the pioneering work of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) (hereafter RR) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) (hereafter LYS)
. RR argue that a natural classi…cation of exchange rate regimes should be based on the behavior of the parallel market exchange rates on the grounds that they better re ‡ect underlying market and monetary conditions than do the country's o¢ cial exchange rates. LYS, on the other hand, advocate the use of a k-means cluster sorting algorithm to assign countries to the various exchange rate regimes. 2 The idea that underlies our classi…cation method goes like this. It must be the case that many countries actually do what they say and that the regime they report results 1 Reference to potential inconsistencies between de jure and de facto regimes dates back at least to Frankel and Wei (1995) . While some de jure exchange rate …xers may appear to be de facto ‡oaters due to frequent changes in their peg, others that are de jure ‡oaters appear to be de facto …xers since they maintain very stable exchange rates-a phenomenon that Calvo and Reinhart (2002) refer to as 'fear of ‡oating. ' 2 Assessing the role of a country's exchange rate regime in economic performance is an active area of research. The LYS classi…cations have been used by Juhn and Mauro (2002) , who explore the long-run determinants of exchange rate regimes, Bordo and Flandreau (2001) , who examine the link between …nancial depth and exchange rate regimes, Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2002) who use it to examine the link between regime choice and local interest rate sensitivity, Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Broda (2004) , who analyze the impact of terms of trade on economic performance under di¤erent regimes. Both the LYS and RR regime classi…cations are used by Alesina and Wagner (2003) to …nd the politico-economic institutional qualities of countries with di¤erent exchange rate regimes. RR is employed by Reinhart, Rogo¤ and Savastano (2003) , who attempt to correlate the degree of exchange rate ‡exibility and degree and type of …nancial dollarization and Rogo¤ et.al (2004) , who explore economic performance under alternative regimes. from thoughtful assessments of perceived, economically relevant exchange rate stability. Under this supposition, we model the de jure responses econometrically and use estimation of the systematic component of the response to create the de facto classi…cation. The unsystematic component-the error term-thus captures the unobservable factors that in ‡uence some countries to announce an exchange rate policy that di¤ers from the one that is implemented.
The model that we employ for this purpose views the de jure classi…cations as outcomes of a multinomial logit choice problem conditional on measures of volatility in the country's e¤ective exchange rate, its bilateral exchange rate against an appropriate anchor currency, and international reserves. As one of the determinants of the choice problem is the volatility of the country's e¤ective exchange rate, we refer to our de facto regime assignments as the 'e¤ective'exchange rate regime classi…cation. Country-year observations are then assigned to the regime with the highest predictive probability, which we obtain from the multinomial logit, to create a de facto 'e¤ective' exchange rate regime classi…cation. 3 This approach has three attractive features. First, classi…er judgment is required primarily in selecting the variables to be included in the econometrics. Modifying and updating the classi…cations becomes straightforward since one only needs to adjust or update the data employed in estimation of the choice problem. Second, the optimization criteria of our approach is familiar as it is based on the likelihood principle and has well-known properties. Here, the di¢ culties associated with 'inconclusive'observations is much less problematic. Third, it is feasible with our method to include a potentially large number of regime determinants. 4 A novel aspect of our paper worth emphasizing is our use of e¤ective exchange rate volatility as one of the classi…cation determinants whereas previous research has typically emphasized the properties of a bilateral exchange rate against an anchor currency. For a small open economy in a multilateral world, there are at least three reasons why the behavior of the e¤ective exchange rate might in ‡uence the generalized assessment of currency stability. First, consider countries that maintain a hard bilateral peg. Unless they trade exclusively with the anchor currency country or within a bloc that pegs to the same anchor, the e¤ective exchange rate will exhibit more instability than the bilateral exchange rate. Argentina is a case in point. Its operation of the currency board made it a hard …xer to the US dollar. However, in 2000 only 16 percent of its trade was with the US whereas 27 percent was with Brazil, 7 percent with Chile and 4 percent with Germany. As a result, its e¤ective exchange rate during this time exhibited substantially more instability than the peso-US dollar rate. 5 Second, consider those countries that engage in relatively little trade with the anchor country. For these countries, the instability in the bilateral rate against the anchor may be relatively unimportant. In fact, we …nd that in approximately half of the observations the volatility of the e¤ective exchange rate lies below that of the bilateral exchange rate. Third, the multilateral approach to assessing exchange rate stability can be motivated as central banks increasingly diversify their reserve holdings away from the US dollar denominated assets, as recently announced by the Bank of Korea. 6 Having obtained these e¤ective classi…cations, we use them to study the impact of exchange rate regimes on GDP growth. Economic theory does not have clear-cut predictions about how the exchange rate regime a¤ects growth. Typically, analysis of the trade-o¤s associated with …xed versus ‡exible exchange rates are conducted in terms of the regime's e¤ect on stabilization and trade and their e¤ect on growth is imperfectly understood. Empirical …ndings on relation between the exchange rate regime and output growth reported in the literature are also mixed. Broadly speaking, Ghosh et. al. (2002) who use the de jure classi…cations, and RR report that higher growth is associated with the more stable currency value regimes. LYS, on the other hand, …nd that higher growth is associated with more exchange rate ‡exibility where the highest growth rate is associated with ‡oaters, followed by …xers then intermediates. When we estimate panel data growth regressions using the e¤ective regimes and a standard set of growth determinants, we …nd that higher growth is associated with …xed exchange rate regimes. This result is driven mainly by the experience of nonindustrialized countries since we …nd that industrial country growth is not signi…cantly related to the exchange rate regime. 5 Over our full sample (1971 to 2002), Argentina's e¤ective exchange rate volatility measured as the annualized standard deviation of monthly percent changes, was 25.9 percent whereas the volatility of the peso-dollar rate was 18.3 percent. While for hard …xers, the e¤ective exchange rate is clearly more volatile than the bilateral exchange rate we …nd in general that there is no presumption regarding the volatility ranking between bilateral and e¤ective exchange rates. We have about as many of our country-year observations exhibit e¤ective exchange rate volatility that lies below bilateral exchange rate volatility as those that lie above. 6 New York Times, Feb 22, 2005.
We also examine whether di¤erences between what a country says and what it does matters for growth. Genberg and Swoboda (2004) hypothesize an asymmetry between countries that say they …x but ‡oat and for countries that say they ‡oat but …x. A de jure …xer that ‡oats de facto is breaking a promise to maintain a stable currency value and might be expected to be punished with inferior growth. On the other hand, a de jure ‡oater that …xes de facto-one that exhibits fear of ‡oating-does not violate any such agreement. Instead, it comes in above expectations by delivering exchange rate performance that is superior to what was promised and might be expected to be rewarded with superior growth outcomes. We …nd evidence in support of these hypothesized asymmetries. For nonindustrialized countries, we …nd growth to be signi…cantly higher for de jure ‡oaters who e¤ectively …x de facto. These countries therefore have a direct motive to display fear of ‡oating if it results in signi…cantly faster growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an informal analysis of bilateral and e¤ective exchange rates that highlights the di¤erence in behavior between them. Section 2 presents our regime-choice model and discusses features of our e¤ective exchange rate classi…cations. Section 3 contains our analysis of the relationship between the exchange rate regime and growth and Section 4 concludes. A description of the data, variable construction and sources is contained in the Appendix.
Properties of e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates
Our task, as well as the task confronting the authorities, is to classify country exchange rate policy according to the de jure categories [see Ghosh et. al. (2000) ] which we arrange in order of increasing stability. Typically, researchers have emphasized the properties of the bilateral exchange rate of an anchor currency in connection with regimes classi…cation. 7 The informal comparison between e¤ective and bilateral nominal exchange rates presented in this section shows that a very di¤erent picture about both the level and the volatility of a country's currency value can emerge depending on whether it is viewed through the lens of a bilateral or a multilateral exchange rate. Their properties are su¢ ciently di¤erent for us to conclude that the e¤ective exchange rate contains information beyond that contained in the bilateral exchange rate that is relevant for a country in announcing the de jure regime that describes how it manages its currency. Anchor currencies for bilateral exchange rates are either the U.S. dollar, the British pound, the French franc, or the German mark. For this, we follow the country assignment used in LYS. Because e¤ective exchange rate series do not exist for most nonindustrialized countries, these data are constructed by us. 8 We divide our discussion between an examination of the volatility of the alternative exchange rate measures and a comparison of their dynamics.
Volatility
We measure volatility as the annual sample standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate. The e¤ective and bilateral exchange rate will exhibit the same degree of stability only if the country does all of its trade with the country to which it …xes or trades only with countries that also …x to the same currency. Such may approximately be the case for the Bahamas, which is a hard …xer to the US dollar and who in 2000 did 86 percent of its trade with the U.S., but this is an extreme case. Other counties that pegged to the dollar include Panama, who in 2000 conducted 40 7 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002) , Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Shambaugh (2004) . 8 We begin with aggregated trade data obtained from the United Nation's Comtrade database. These are imports and exports according to SITC rev.1 commodity classi…cation or SITC rev.2 data when SITC rev.1 was not available for a particular country/year. For each reporting country i = 1; : : : ; 180 and year (t = 1971; : : : ; 2002), set of weights are formed by taking trade between country i and j as a fraction of country i's total trade for that year. These weights are used to construct the geometric average of respective bilateral nominal exchange rates and normalized such that their value in December 2000 is 100 to form the e¤ective exchange rate. The NEER for country i at month m of year t is constructed as:
wijt where N EER imt is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate for country i at month m of year t, BN E ijmt is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and j at month m of year t calculated as the relative rates per U.S. dollar, w ijt is the trade weight between county i and j at year t, and N is total number of countries.
percent of its trade with the U.S., 7 percent with Ecuador, 7 percent with Venezuela and 5 percent with Japan. Further down the line is China, which in 2000 did 19 percent of its trade with Japan, 17 percent with the U.S., 12 percent with Hong Kong, 8 percent with Korea and 5 percent with Germany. 9 The presumption is that the volatility of the e¤ective exchange rate will exceed that of the bilateral exchange rate for countries that maintain a hard bilateral peg. Figure 1 presents scatter plots of the volatility of countries' e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates. Hard bilateral …xers should appear below the 45 degree line and roughly half of the countries …t this pattern, as e¤ective exchange rate volatility exceeds bilateral exchange rate volatility in 92 of the 172 countries for which we have data. Of these, 12 are OECD members.
Somewhat surprisingly, about half of the sample lie above the 45 degree line. For these countries, bilateral exchange rate volatility may be relatively unimportant if they do relatively little trade with the anchor country. As the data points appear randomly distributed about the 45 degree line, there seems to be no presumption as to whether e¤ective exchange rate volatility dominates bilateral exchange rate volatility. 10 
Dynamics
We compare the dynamic behavior between bilateral and multilateral exchange rate measures by regressing changes in the e¤ective exchange rate on changes in the bilateral exchange rate at various horizons as well as in the levels of the observations. The levels observations are standardized so that the slope coe¢ cient gives us an estimate of the correlation. 11 9 In 2000, the U.S.'s major trading partners were Canada (21 percent) and Mexico (13 percent), Japan (11 percent) and China (6 percent). 10 Countries whose e¤ective exchange rate volatility exceeded bilateral exchange rate volatility by 50 percent (excluding those who maintained a hard …x throughout the sample) include Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belg. Lux, Belize, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus, Czecho, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guinea Bis, Haiti, Kuwait, Lao, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Neth.Ant.A, Netherland, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arab, Singapore, Slovakia, Somalia, Suriname, Switzerland, UAE and USA. Countries whose bilateral exchange rate volatility exceeded e¤ective exchange rate volatility by 50 percent or more include Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cent.Af.Rep.,China, Macao, Cote d'Ivorie, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Iceland, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, SaoTomePri, Senegal, Seychelles, Swaziland, Syria, Tonga, TrinTobago, Tunisia, Uganda and Ukraine. 11 We standardize the levels observations because the e¤ective exchange rate is actually an index and is scaled di¤erently from the bilateral exchange rate. Table 1 shows the percentage of countries for which slope coe¢ cient estimates indicate dynamic divergence between e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates. The coe¢ cients for most countries exhibit large deviations from unity across the various horizons. At the monthly horizon most of the slope coe¢ cients are positive but very small in magnitude. However, for many countries, the monthly change in the bilateral exchange rate is negatively correlated with the change in the e¤ective exchange rate since negative point estimates are obtained for 21 of 157 available countries (13.4 percent). The discordance between the dynamics of e¤ective and bilateral measures of the exchange rate tends to increase with the time horizon: Slope coe¢ cient estimates are negative for 16 (of 152 available) countries for annual percent changes, 21 (of 138 available) countries at the 4-year horizon, and for 49 (of 157 available) countries when the regressions are performed on exchange rate levels.
Looking only at the correlation between changes in the e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates will in some cases obscure an underlying divergence in their trends, which is illustrated in the case of Denmark. Figure 2 shows plots of the monthly percent change, 4-year percent change and the levels of e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates for Denmark. 12 While there has been an e¤ective appreciation of the krone over the sample period and a bilateral depreciation with respect to the deutschemark, …rst-di¤erences in the two exchange rate measures are positively correlated. 13 The e¤ective and bilateral exchange rates for Canada and many European countries exhibit similar patterns (not shown).
The descriptive statistics that we report combine experiences across regimes ranging from hyperin ‡ation to currency board hard …xes. What these very aggregative summary statistics on volatility suggest, however, is that a very di¤erent picture about exchange volatility exposure emerges when viewed through the lens of e¤ective rather than bilateral exchange rates. 12 The reciprocal of nominal e¤ective exchange rates are plotted. Therefore, the decrease of NEER represents appreciation of e¤ective rate. Both e¤ective rates and bilateral rate are normalized in the plot. 13 Two trend-stationary series fx t g and fy t g can trend in opposite directions and have positively correlated changes if the times when both series increase x t experiences large changes and y t experiences small changes and vice-versa when both series decrease. Suppose that y t = (1 ) + y t 1 + " t ;
(0; ); 11 = 22 = 1; 12 > 0; 0 < ; < 1: Let < 0 and > 0 so that they trend in opposite directions. Denoting the deviation from the mean with a '~', it follows that the covariance between changes in x t and y t is E ( e y t e x t ) = (1 )
2 E¤ective exchange rate regime classi…cations
We present the discrete choice model for the de jure classi…cations in section 2.1. Section 2.2 discusses general features of our e¤ective exchange rate classi…cations with comparisons to alternative classi…cations. In section 2.3, the comparison among the alternative classi…cations is specialized to a selected set of countries.
Modeling regime choice probabilities
The approach we follow is commonly employed to model household revealed preferences from survey responses. We begin with a latent variable model of the determination of the de jure classi…cations where the 'true'exchange rate regime perceived by the country's monetary authorities R ijt are given by
x it is a vector of the country's characteristics and the error ijt has an extreme value distribution. Let the revealed de jure classi…cations of the country's exchange rate policy be R ijt . Then the probability p ijt that country i = 1; :::N reports itself to pursue policy j = 1; :::6 in year t is the conditional multinomial choice probability
where j is a vector of coe¢ cients associated with regime j which we estimate as a random-e¤ects panel regression. 14 The regime categories in the multinomial logit speci…cation are unordered. This has an important advantage over an ordered response model in our context because it allows for coe¢ cient heterogeneity across regimes. That is, we allow the impact of country i's k th characteristic on the choice probability to di¤er across policy choices whereas an ordered response model imposes homogeneity restrictions on the coe¢ cients across regimes. With our emphasis on measurement as opposed to inference, we choose to adopt the less restrictive approach.
The country i characteristics that we use to form x it are i) the volatility of the e¤ec-tive exchange rate, ii) the mean absolute change (an alternative measure of volatility) of the e¤ective exchange rate, iii) the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate, iv) the mean absolute change in the bilateral exchange rate, and v) the volatility of the country's international reserves. 15 Reserve volatility is predicted to be directly related to the '…xity'
in the exchange rate regime, the idea being that high reserve volatility is associated with frequent foreign exchange market intervention and active management. We use the estimated parameters b j ; j = 1:::6; to obtain the predictive probability that a country with characteristic vector x it will exhibit exchange rate policy j. We can then assign the regime with the highest predictive probability to the country-year observation. Alternatively, we can use the predicted mean value to form a continuous exchange rate stability index IDX ijt = P 6 j=1 jp ijt :
Some properties of e¤ective regime classi…cations
The distribution of the classi…cations generated by alternative speci…cations of the country characteristics is displayed in Table 2 . Our preferred classi…cation, described under the heading 'combined,' employs both measures of e¤ective exchange rate dispersion (volatility and mean absolute deviation), the mean absolute change in the bilateral exchange rate and international reserve volatility. 16 It can be seen that most of the country-year observations lie towards the stable exchange rate region of the spectrum being classi…ed into categories 4 (cooperative) and 5 (limited ‡exibility). 64 observations are classi…ed as hard …xers. The next largest classi…cation is category 1 (independently ‡oating), which forms 17% of the observations. Under the column heading 'drop bilateral,' we list the distribution of classi…cations generated with the volatility and mean absolute change in the e¤ective exchange rate and reserve volatility (properties of the bilateral exchange rate omitted). Here, we obtain nearly the same number of free- ‡oaters, but many more …xers (categories 5 and 6). The tendency to classify country-year ob- 15 Volatility is measured as the annual sample standard deviation of the monthly percentage change in the respective variables. The mean absolute change for year t is similarly computed from the annual average of monthly percentage changes. We note also that interest rate volatility is also an important characteristic to determine exchange rate regimes. However, due to the data availability problem, we lost signi…cant number of observations in estimation, and we dropped the interest rate volatility from the estimation problem. 16 The individual coe¢ cient estimates from the multinomial logit do not have natural interpretations in this context and are not reported. We originally performed estimation using all …ve variables but because bilateral exchange rate volatility and mean absolute change measures are highly correlated (0.94) we dropped the volatility measure. Very similar results are obtained by keeping bilateral volatility and dropping the bilateral mean absolute change.
servations as …xers is even more pronounced when we omit the e¤ective exchange rate and use the volatility and mean absolute change in the bilateral exchange rate along with reserve volatility. These classi…cations are shown under the column heading 'drop e¤ective.' Thus using only the e¤ective exchange rate or bilateral exchange rate results in a dearth of countries being classi…ed in the middle. Figure 3 plots the evolution of our preferred e¤ective classi…cations along with the de jure, LYS, and RR classi…cations. 17 In the de jure classi…cations, the sample begins with nearly all countries reporting to be …xers (categories 5 and 6). This proportion has declined steadily over time with an increasing number of countries having moved towards reporting themselves to be pursuing a policy of ‡exible exchange rates (categories 1 and 2). The 'hollowing out of the middle'phenomenon-the decline in the number of countries reporting intermediate regimes-is seen only in the de jure classi…cation. The evolution of e¤ective pure ‡oaters is similar to that of de jure ‡oaters. Very few country-year observations are classi…ed as e¤ective hard …xers. Most observations are placed in categories 1, 4, and 5 with a relatively large proportion of category 5 regimes (limited ‡exibility). There was a tendency to move away from …xing in the 1970s but the proportion of …xers has remained stable in the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly, looking at e¤ective categories 5 and 6 to RR's category 5 and comparing e¤ective categories 1 and 2 to RR's categories 1 and 2, the e¤ective classi…cation exhibits a higher correspondence to RR's 'natural classi…cation'than it does either to LYS or the de jure classi…cations. The distribution over time of the RR classi…cation is relatively stable with many more intermediate regimes than our e¤ective classi…cation. One possible reason for this stability is that RR employ a 5-year window for computing exchange rate variability whereas we (and LYS) employed a one-year window. The LYS classi…cation consistently classi…es the majority of observations into the …xed category. More than 70 percent of LYS observations were classi…ed as …xers in 1974 and approximately 55 percent were still classi…ed as …xers in 2000. Table 3 shows the unconditional correlation matrix for the alternative classi…ca-tions and the country characteristics that we used to produce the e¤ective classi…cation. Among alternative classi…cations, our e¤ective classi…cations are most highly correlated 17 Our e¤ective classi…cations are not directly comparable to RR nor LYS since they do not provide a 6-way classi…cation. For RR, we reversed and renumbered their 5-way classi…cation broken down as 1) Freely falling, 2) Freely ‡oating, 3) Managed ‡oating, 4)Limited ‡exibility, 5) Peg. For LYS, we examine their 4-way classi…cation broken down as 1) Flexible, 2) Dirty Float, 3) Crawling Peg, and 4) Fixed. Both RR and LYS have a category for observations that are deemed 'inconclusive,' which we omitted in drawing the …gures.
with RR (0.53) and are least correlated with the IMF de jure classi…cations (0.32). As expected, the e¤ective regime classi…cations are negatively correlated with both measures of e¤ective exchange rate variability as are the RR classi…cations. Neither LYS nor the de jure classi…cations appear to be systematically related to volatility in the e¤ective exchange rate.
None of the four classi…cations are very correlated with reserve volatility. The correlation is slightly positive for the e¤ective, de jure and LYS and slightly negative for RR. Increasing ‡exibility in the e¤ective and RR classi…cations are associated with higher bilateral exchange rate variability. The correlations between these variables and the de jure and the LYS classi…cations are relatively small. Table 4 presents cross tabulations between the e¤ective classi…cation, the de jure, LYS and RR classi…cations. Looking at the …rst panel of the table, a perfect correspondence between what countries say and what they do would result in nonzero values only on the diagonal entries. Divergence takes the form of countries that say they ‡oat but are de facto …xers (fear of ‡oating) and those that say they …x but are de facto ‡oaters. As can be seen, of 853 de jure ‡oaters (categories 1-2), fear of ‡oating is observed in 265 observations that are e¤ectively classi…ed as …xers (categories 5 and 6) whereas 84 out of 1035 de jure …xers (categories 5-6) are e¤ectively classi…ed as ‡oaters.
There are some notable di¤erences between our e¤ective classi…cations and LYS. 63 LYS ‡oaters (category 1) are classi…ed as e¤ective …xers (categories 5 and 6) and 74 LYS …xers were classi…ed as e¤ective ‡oaters (categories 1 and 2). The cross-tabulation with RR is relatively concentrated on and just below the diagonal. As we've seen before, the overall correlation between the e¤ective and RR classi…cations are relatively high which can be seen in the cross-tabulation table. Table 5 reports the distribution of the e¤ective classi…cations across industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. For nonindustrialized countries, most country-year are assigned to category 5, re ‡ecting substantial exchange rate stability. For industrialized countries, approximately 15 percent of the country-year observations are assigned as 'independently ‡oating'and roughly 80 percent are assigned to relatively stable exchange rate categories 4 and 5.
The table also shows the regime assignments broken down according to whether the country experience a crisis during the sample year. A crisis is said to occur in year t if the country experienced a month-to-month change in its e¤ective exchange rate exceeding 25 percent. Of 5760 country-year observations, there were 434 crisis observations, 424 of which occurred in nonindustrialized countries and 10 for industrialized countries. We note that our classi…cation methodology does not automatically consign crisis observations to a free ‡oat since as can be seen, a relatively large share of crisis country-year observations continue to be grouped in categories 4 and above (28 percent).
Comparison of alternative classi…cations for selected countries
How do the alternative classi…cations compare for speci…c countries? Table 6 gives the evolution of exchange rate regime classi…cations for a set of emerging market economiesArgentina, Mexico, Peru, and Korea. For Argentina, there is some disagreement across the classi…cations in the early 70s. In the late 70s, our method and RR classi…es it as a ‡oater whereas LYS classi…es it as a …xer. In the 90s the country is generally classi…ed as a …xer by each of the classi…cation methods. In 1993, our method classi…es Argentina as a ‡oater whereas the de jure, LYS, and RR methods classify it as a …xer. Ostensibly, the reason that our method gives this result is that Brazil, a large trading partner of Argentina's was heading into a period of high in ‡ation and the real depreciated by 2000 percent against the dollar. This depreciation was re ‡ected in instability of the e¤ective exchange rate. 18 For Mexico, the e¤ective classi…cation largely agrees with RR until the mid 1990s. In the 1970s, LYS systematically classi…es the peso to be more ‡exible than the assignment given by either RR or the e¤ective classi…cation. Similarly, for Peru, the e¤ective classi…cation is largely consistent with RR. For Korea, all three de facto classi…cations are quite similar with each other. Throughout the sample, they consistently view the won as being more stable than its de jure ‡oater classi…cation. Korea thus appears to be a classic example of fear of ‡oating, especially after the crisis of 1997.
We note that each of the de facto classi…cations exhibit periods of volatility. The RR regimes for Argentina jump from 2 to 6 back to 2 from 1984 to 1986. LYS's classi…cation for Peru jumps from 5 to 2 to 4 between 1974 and 1976. The e¤ective regimes switch from 5 to 1 back to 5 between 1992 and 1994. However, our methodology also allows us to use the estimated choice probabilities construct a continuous index of exchange rate stability from the mean regime value, Being a mean value, the index is seen to exhibit less volatility and fewer extreme values than the classi…cation data. Table 7 displays alternative classi…cations for the US, France, Japan, and Switzerland. The e¤ective classi…cation places the dollar in an intermediate regime and characterizes it as being somewhat more stable than RR or LYS. For France, our e¤ective classi…cation corresponds closely to RR by assessing the franc to be a relatively stable currency whereas LYS often classi…es the franc to be relatively ‡exible. The e¤ective classi…cation for Switzerland corresponds more closely to LYS than it does to RR and all of the de facto methods classify this country's exchange rate as more stable than its de jure classi…cation. From 1973 onwards, Switzerland can consistently be described as having a fear of ‡oating. For Japan, our e¤ective classi…cation is largely in agreement with RR and its de jure classi…cation as a ‡oater whereas LYS tends to classify its exchange rate as being somewhat more stable.
Exchange rate regimes and growth
In this section, we employ the e¤ective exchange rate classi…cations to study the relation between the exchange rate regime and GDP growth. Our analysis centers on two questions. In subsection 3.1, we revisit the question of which exchange rate regime-…xed, ‡exible, or something in between-is associated with the highest rates of growth. In subsection 3.2 we examine whether di¤erences between what a country says to be its exchange rate policy (its de jure classi…cation) and what it does (its de facto classi…cation) matter for growth.
Exchange-rate stability and growth
Although there exists an extensive literature that studies the choice between …xed and ‡exible exchange rates, economic theory does not have clear-cut predictions about the impact of the exchange rate regime on growth. This is partly because the tradeo¤ between …xed and ‡exible exchange rates is usually evaluated in terms of the stabilization and trade promoting properties of alternative monetary arrangements and the e¤ect that smoothing out cyclical ‡uctuations and trade creation have on growth may be indirect. Frankel (2003) discusses the tradeo¤s along four main points. For his four reasons to …x we begin with the observation that stable exchange rates provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy. A policy of …xing the exchange rate can impose the required discipline on the monetary authorities to keep in ‡ation under control. Second, by reducing uncertainty, maintaining stability in the currency's value can promote increased international trade and investment. Third, maintaining a …x precludes competitive depreciations which can have a destructive e¤ect on trade. Fourth, the exchange rate will not be driven by speculative bubbles if it is …xed.
He also discusses four reasons why countries may want to promote exchange rate ‡exibility. First, by allowing an independent monetary policy, policy makers retain a tool to o¤set adverse country shocks. Second, a ‡exible exchange rate provides an avenue for required relative price adjustments to trade shocks. Third, because a ‡oating rate regime breaks the connection between international reserves and credit creation, it allows the central bank to be an e¤ective lender of last resort and to retain seignorage revenues. Fourth, the central bank would not be the target of a speculative attack on its currency.
The weight of the evidence points towards high growth being associated with more stable exchange rates. Some indirect evidence is provided by Frankel and Romer (1999) who …nd that an increase in trade has a signi…cant positive e¤ect on per capita income, and Frankel and Rose (2002) who present evidence that trade bene…ts when exchange rates are stabilized. The estimates from the latter paper imply that membership in a currency union can raise trade with other union members by a factor of 3. 19 In research that directly examines the relation between exchange rate regimes and growth, Ghosh et. al. (2000) and RR generally …nd that higher growth is associated with exchange rate stability. Ghosh et. al. estimate the growth-rate ordering of de jure regimes (from highest to lowest) as i) intermediate regimes, ii) …xers, then iii) ‡oaters while RR report a growth-rate ordering of i) limited ‡exibility, ii) freely ‡oating, iii) managed ‡oat and iv) peg. LYS, on the other hand, …nd that the highest growth rates are associated with ‡oaters, followed by …xers then intermediate regimes. Their results are driven in largely by the experience of nonindustrialized countries-the growth rate of nonindustrialized LYS ‡oaters is approximately 1.1 percent higher than LYS intermediate and …xer countries. Edwards (2001) , although analyzing a much smaller set of countries, …nds that countries that have 'dollarized'have grown more slowly than nondollarized countries.
In our analysis, we follow the literature by collapsing our six-way e¤ective exchange rate classi…cation into a three categories by combining categories 1-2 ( ‡oaters), [3] [4] (intermediates), and 5-6 (…xers). We also include an analysis with the LYS classi…cations for comparative purposes since the e¤ective classi…cations contrasted sharply with those. Table 8 provides a …rst look at the data by reporting mean GDP growth and volatility sorted by exchange rate regime. For e¤ective regime classi…cations, intermediate regime countries have the highest mean growth rate. Non industrialized countries with an e¤ective intermediate classi…cation also have the lowest volatility in GDP growth. As a group, e¤ective …xers have the second highest growth rate and e¤ective ‡oaters had the lowest growth rates. LYS ‡oaters, on the other hand, have the highest mean growth and the lowest volatility while LYS intermediates have the lowest mean growth rate. Among industrialized countries, the highest mean growth rate is achieved by LYS …xers. Among nonindustrialized countries, the highest mean growth rate is experienced by LYS ‡oaters.
We now proceed to an econometric investigation. Our strategy is to consider regressions of per capita growth on a set of growth control variables and a set of exchange rate regime dummies. It is well established that investments in physical and human capital, good macroeconomic policies, exposure to trade, and some government spending are factors that are conducive to growth. Thus, our control variables consist of i) initial year GDP, ii) initial year population, iii) population growth, iv) the investment to GDP ratio, v) secondary education attainment, vi) a political indicator of civil liberties, vii) trade openness, viii) the change in the terms of trade, ix) dummies for transitional economies, x) regional dummies for Latin America and Africa, and xi) time-speci…c dummies. Exchange rate regime 1 is taken as the base, so growth e¤ects implied by coe¢ cients on exchange rate regime dummies are relative to the growth rate of ‡oaters. 20 We estimate random-e¤ects panel regressions and report the results in Table 9 . To economize on space, we do not report coe¢ cient estimates for the auxiliary controls. Here, we …nd that the highest growth rates are associated with de facto …xers. With all countries in the sample, the coe¢ cient on the …xer dummy is signi…cant and we estimate that e¤ective …xers grow a bit more than 1 percent faster than e¤ective ‡oaters. For industrialized countries, the coe¢ cients on the regime dummies are positive and suggest slower growth for e¤ective ‡oaters than e¤ective intermediates and …xers, but these estimates are not statistically signi…cant. For nonindustrialized countries, we obtain a signi…cant estimate of the coe¢ cient on the …xer dummy. If this is a causal relationship, our estimates would imply that switching from a ‡oat to a …x would increase per capita growth by 1.3 percent . 20 These controls are generally the same ones employed by LYS.
The estimates suggest a monotone relationship between exchange rate stability and growth. Additional evidence along these lines can be obtained by replacing the regime dummies with our index of exchange rate stability, IDX it : When we do so, we obtain positive point estimates in the regressions that are signi…cant in the full sample and for nonindustrialized countries. A unit increase in the stability index (higher means more stability) is associated with nearly a 1 2 percent increase in per capita growth. The contrast between our results and LYS is primarily due to di¤erences between our regime classi…cations and not in the data since we are able to qualitatively replicate LYS's results with our data. 21 Using the LYS classi…cations in growth regressions for nonindustrialized countries, growth for intermediate regimes are signi…cantly lower at the 10% level than growth for ‡oaters and the coe¢ cient on LYS …xers is negative but insigni…cant. Their classi…cation method assigns a larger proportion of country-year observations in the …xer category than does the e¤ective classi…cation used in this paper.
Words, actions, and growth
In this section, we investigate whether the di¤erence between what a country says and what it does matters for growth. In this analysis, we assign country-observations into 4 words and action categories.
i) {de jure ‡oaters \ de facto ‡oaters}, ii) {de jure …xers \ de facto …xers}, iii) {de jure ‡oaters \ de facto …xers}, iv) {de jure …xers \ de facto ‡oaters}.
Countries in categories i) and ii) do what they say. Countries in categories iii) and iv) do not. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present systematic study of countries in category iii)-countries which they refer to as having a 'fear of ‡oating.' Fear of ‡oating helps to explain the 'hollowing-out of the middle' hypothesis-that according to de jure classi…cations, countries are increasingly adopting either the extremes of …xed or ‡oating exchange rates and are abandoning intermediate regimes. They conclude through examination of the bilateral exchange rate to an anchor currency, reserves, and interest rates that de facto hollowing-out is much less pronounced.
Genberg and Swoboda (2004) hypothesize a performance asymmetry for countries that do not do as they say. Category iv) countries have breached a commitment to maintaining exchange rate stability and countries that fall into this category are hypothesized to su¤er inferior economic outcomes. Fear of ‡oating countries (category iii) on the other hand have not broken any such commitment. Because they deliver better exchange rate performance than promised, they may be expected to be rewarded by superior growth performance.
The evolution of the distribution of observations across categories is shown in Table  10 . In panel A, de facto regimes are given by the e¤ective classi…cations and in panel B, they are given by the LYS classi…cations. For both classi…cations, the proportion of countries that fear ‡oating has steadily increased over time, although the proportion of e¤ective fear of ‡oating is consistently higher than the proportion of LYS fear of ‡oating. While fear of ‡oating has become increasingly prevalent, the proportion of commitment breakers is small (category iv) and has remained fairly stable. Both de facto measures show that the proportion of countries who say that they ‡oat and actually do ‡oat has increased over time whereas the proportion who say they …x and actually do …x has declined over time.
Coe¢ cient estimates on the words and actions dummies from growth regressions are reported in Table 11 . The de jure ‡oat-de facto ‡oat category is taken as the base so growth e¤ects associated with what countries say and what they do are evaluated relative to the growth rate of de facto ‡oaters who say they ‡oat. These regressions also include the full set of control variables used in our previous regressions.
For actions determined by e¤ective classi…cation, we obtain positive coe¢ cients on the …x-…x category which although insigni…cant, suggest there might be some growth advantage for countries that say they …x and do relative to those who say they ‡oat and do. Similarly, negative but insigni…cant coe¢ cients are obtained on the …x- ‡oat category weakly suggests that countries who break their commitment to stable currency values experience lower growth than those who say they ‡oat and do. Where we do …nd a statistically signi…cant e¤ect is on the ‡oat-…x (fear of ‡oating) dummy. We estimate that the growth rate of countries that say they ‡oat but maintain stable currency values exceeds the growth rate of those who say and do ‡oat by 0.7 percent.
There is little evidence that discrepancies between what countries say and what they do matter for growth of industrialized countries, as none of the coe¢ cients on the category dummies are signi…cant.
For nonindustrialized countries, we estimate the growth bene…t to fear of ‡oating to be even more pronounced (and signi…cant) at 1.12 percent above countries in the ‡oat- ‡oat category. The coe¢ cient on the …x-…x category is now more precisely estimated (tstatistic=1.61, p-value=0.053 for one-sided test), providing marginally stronger evidence of growth advantages for countries that say they …x to carry through with …xing. Thus, when de facto regimes are given by the e¤ective classi…cation, the evidence from growth regressions are largely supportive of Genberg-Swoboda's hypothesis that bene…ts accrue to fear of ‡oating and the asymmetries between ‡oating when the country says it will …x and …xing when it says it will ‡oat. When the de facto regime is given by the LYS classi…cations, none of the estimated slope coe¢ cients on the category dummies are signi…cant. For nonindustrialized countries, the coe¢ cient on LYS fear of ‡oating countries is negative.
Conclusion
Our e¤ective de facto exchange rate regime classi…cation method meets three objectives. We have designed a method that i) uses tools that are familiar to economists, ii) can replicated, modi…ed, and updated in a straightforward manner, and iii) produces sensible results. In producing the classi…cations, we employed information contained in the e¤ective exchange rate. The use of the e¤ective exchange rate in our analysis leads to an improvement in classifying regimes and underscores the value in taking a multilateral approach in forming a generalized assessment of national policy towards exchange rate management.
Our investigation of the impact of exchange rate regimes and growth found that the highest growth to be associated with de facto …xers. This is in line with much of the extant literature and is consistent with research that has found trade bene…ts from currency blocs. Whether the growth advantages that we …nd are the result of maintaining a stable currency per se or from selection of countries that are members of trade and currency blocs is unanswered but is a problem for future research.
While the exchange rate regime adopted de facto appears to matter for growth, we also …nd evidence that it matters what countries say-especially if the do not do what they say. Our estimation results give the following rank-ordering of GDP growth from highest to lowest for words and actions categories: i) de jure ‡oaters-de facto …xers …rst, ii) de jure …xers-de facto …xers, iii) de jure ‡oaters-de facto ‡oaters, and iv) de jure …xers-de facto ‡oaters. Countries may have a good reason to display fear of ‡oating since those that do experience signi…cantly higher per capita growth. Notes: EFF is our preferred classi…cation, EV (BV) is e¤ective (bilateral) exchange rate volatility, EMC (BMC) is the mean absolute change in the e¤ective (bilateral) exchange rate, and RV is international reserve volatility. Table 9 : GDP Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes A monthly data set extending from 1960.01 to 2002.12 was used to construct annual volatility measures and other pieces of the annual data set. The monthly data set is comprised of the following.
Net Reserves: (in US$) (IFS line 1L.DZF) When this data was clearly reported on a quarterly basis (i.e., at least 2 consecutive periods), the data was interpolated to get monthly data points. A full list is available upon request. Some data anomalies were discovered in the raw data. Negative reserves were observed for several months for the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon. Negative reserves in only one month were reported for Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Ukraine. Except for the Ukraine, these are all Central Franc Zone countries.
We note that this is not the same de…nition of reserves as that reported by LYS. We attempted to re-create their reserve data. They describe it as the foreign assets less foreign liabilities and central government deposits (IFS: line 11, line 16c, line 16d). These data contained many anomalies-LYS reserves are negative for 30 percent of all observations and data are partially or entirely missing for many important countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom). The reserve measure we utilize has approximately 10,000 more observations than LYS.
Nominal exchange rate: 2 bilateral (US$) measures as in annual data.
Nominal e¤ective exchange rates: Using trade weights from Comtrade data set. Additionally, to give these time series properties, they were smoothed using a 12 month moving average (5 lags, 6 leads, including observation).
